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COMMENTS

SIDERMAN DE BLAKE v. REPUBLIC OF
ARGENTINA: CAN THE FSIA GRANT
IMMUNITY FOR VIOLATIONS OF
JUS COGENS NORMS?
The search for peace and justice also means respect for
human dignity. All the signatories of the United Nations
Charter have pledged themselves to observe and to respect
basic human rights. Thus, no member of the United Nations
can claim that mistreatment of its citizens is solely its own
business. Equally, no member can avoid its responsibilities to
review and to speak when torture or unwarranted
deprivation occurs in any part of the world.
-President Jimmy Carter1
I.

INTRODUCTION

Historically, the king could do no wrong. As a sovereign,
he was immune from suit. Monarchies slowly gave way to
.republics, and this rule was extended to "acts of state," at least
insofar as other nations' courts were concerned. That is, one
state was considered immune from the judgment of another
state's courts.2 A fundamental problem arises, however, when
the sovereign nation is alleged to have violated norms of international law from which no derogation is permitted by the international community of nations' jus cogens norms.' Since no

1. President Jimmy Carter, Peace, Arms Control, World Economic Progress,
Human Rights: Basic Priorities of U.S. Foreign Policy, Address Before the United
Nations (Mar. 17, 1977), in 78 DEP'T ST. BuLL., Apr. 1977, 329, 332. [hereinafter
Address by President Jimmy Carter].
2. See infra notes 43-55 and accompanying text regarding sovereign immunity.
3. See infra notes 19-42 and accompanying text concerning jus cogens.
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state can ever consent to such a violation, and since such acts
are not even considered sovereign acts, it follows that allegations of such wrongs can never be dismissed by a reviewing
court by simply appealing to sovereign immunity.
Nevertheless, in a recent Ninth Circuit decision, the court
found Argentina to be immune from the jurisdiction of United
States courts by way of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
(FSIA), despite a strong finding that Argentina had violated a
jus cogens norm. In Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina,4 the Ninth Circuit found that since the FSIA did not specifically refer to jus cogens as one of the exceptions to the
FSIA, Congress did not intend for jus cogens to act as an exception to the FSIA's cloak of immunity.5 This interpretation
not only raises an important question about the FSIA's applicability when violations of jus cogens norms are involved, but
also of the ability of the judiciary to interpret any legislative
act in a manner that is not in accord with accepted principles
of international law which would deny Argentina immunity in
this instance.
This Comment examines the relevant international legal
doctrines surrounding the Ninth Circuit's decision in Siderman
and discusses these doctrines in light of domestic law. It points
out that whereas jus cogens norms have only been scantily addressed in domestic law, the common law is replete with discussions of sovereign immunity. Congress even codified its
interpretation of the doctrine of sovereign immunity in 1976 by
enacting the FSIA.6 However, in keeping with past practice,
the FSIA did not address the issue of jus cogens norms in either the text or the legislative history. As such, where jus
cogens norms are involved, case law compels us to interpret
the FSIA in light of modern international law principles. Such
principles dictate a waiver of immunity for violations of jus
cogens norms and a corresponding exercise of jurisdiction.
The Ninth Circuit easily concluded that the allegations of
torture leveled against the Republic of Argentina in Siderman
violated peremptory norms of international law known as jus

4. 965 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1812 (1993).
5. The Ninth Circuit based its decision on the recent Supreme Court case of
Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428 (1989).
6. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat.
2891 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602-11 (1976)) [hereinafter FSIA].
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cogens. Nevertheless, it accepted Argentina's defense of sovereign immunity, based on the FSIA. This Comment will conclude that the court erred in its findings due to a flawed interpretation of the FSIA.

Finally, this Comment will discuss the importance of using
domestic courts to remedy heinous acts of state. At some point
in the future, there may be international courts to hear individual' claims of jus cogens violations and squarely enforce
their decrees. Until such time, however, a transitional system
for redress must be in place. Domestic courts provide such a
means. They are indispensable fora for upholding such univer-

sal norms.
II. FACTS OF SIDERMAN DE BLAKE V. REPUBLIC OF ARGENTINA
The facts of Siderman de Blake v.Republic of Argentina
consist only of the alleged statements in the complaint submitted by the Siderman family,' but they paint a "horrifying tale
of the violent and brutal excesses of an anti-Semitic military
junta that ruled Argentina."9
During the mid-to-late 1970s, a "dirty war" was waged by
the military in Argentina that was designed to purge the country of suspected subversive activity. In 1975, then-President

7. The International Court of Justice does not provide such a forum. The
Statute of the International Court of Justice specifies that, "[o]nly states may be
parties in cases before the Court." Statute of the International Court of Justice,
June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, T.S. No. 993, 3 Bevans 1179, art. 34, § 1. Thus, an
individual may not appeal to this body for redress, except by way of the
individual's government. Note that there have been many proposals to create international criminal courts where individuals could bring claims.
8. It can be argued that it is particularly burdensome to call upon a sovereign nation to defend itself against allegations that are simply asserted by an
individual in another nation's courts. Indeed, this is one of the reasons for the
development of the doctrine of sovereign immunity. Based on this theory, the
plaintiffs' action should not be sustainable when a charge is leveled in this way.
This Comment, however, will show that violations of jus cogens norms are an exception to this theory. In addition, the FSIA, which codifies the United States' restrictive principles concerning sovereign immunity, recognizes that such a blanket
assertion is faulty. Even under the most narrow interpretation of the FSIA, a
party can simply make assertions that deal with certain injustices and expect that
the sovereign nation will be taken to court to defend itself in the matter. See 28
U.S.C. § 1605 (1988) for the exceptions to the FSIA which allow United States
courts to assert jurisdiction over sovereign nations by simply claiming a violation.
9. Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 703 (9th Cir.
1992), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 1812 (1993).
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Maria Estela Per6n was prompted to declare a "state of siege,"
whereby she entrusted the Argentine Armed Forces with the
responsibility of stifling acts of terrorism. Per6n's downfall,
however, came about on March 24, 1976, when the Argentine
Armed Forces staged a successful coup d'etat and replaced her
with a military junta. 10
That same night, contend the plaintiffs, ten masked men
entered the home of Jos6 and Lea Siderman and, under the
direction of the Military Governor of the province, maliciously
ransacked the Sidermans' home, blindfolded and shackled
sixty-five-year-old Jos6 Siderman, and tossed him into a waiting car. For seven days, he was allegedly beaten and tortured,
as the captors howled anti-Semitic remarks, including "Jew
Bastard" and "Shitty Jew."
When Jose was finally released, he claimed he was told
that he and his family faced death if they remained in Argentina. That day, he and his wife fled to another part of the country, and their son Carlos followed shortly thereafter. In June
1976 they arrived in the United States, the home of their
daughter, Susana Siderman de Blake, who was the final plaintiff in the action. At that point, they had lost their home, most
of their possessions, and were forced to sell Jos6's vast property interests at a deep discount. Furthermore, contend the
plaintiffs, the Argentine government even altered real property
records to show that Jos6's interest in real property was not
127,000 acres but 127. The government then instituted action
against him in Argentina for selling off property interests that
did not belong to him. The government, which by then presented itself as the legitimate government of Argentina, sought the
help of the Los Angeles Superior Court to gain in personam
jurisdiction over Jos6 Siderman. But the government was ultimately unsuccessful in this regard.
In 1982, the family, by then permanent residents of the
United States, filed a complaint against the Republic of Argentina, asserting eighteen causes of action based on the torture
and harassment of Jos6 Siderman by Argentine officials and
the subsequent expropriation of the Sidermans' property and

10. A general description of the coup d'etat can be found in Forti v. SuarezMason, 672 F. Supp. 1531, 1536 (N.D. Cal. 1987). See also Human Rights in the
World: Argentina, 31 INT'L COMM'N OF JURIsTs REv. 1 (1983) (discussing the junta
and its efforts to purge Argentina of alleged subversives).
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business by officials of the Tucumdn Province of Argentina. In
1984 the district court dismissed the expropriation actions,"
and in 1985 the torture claims were dismissed on the grounds
of Argentina's immunity under the FSIA. 12 The Sidermans
appealed both of these decisions.
In 1992 the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit heard
the case. They addressed the expropriation" and torture
claims separately. With respect to the torture claims, which
are the focus of this Comment, the court first looked to the
concept of jus cogens norms,' 4 which encompass certain fundamental norms from which no derogation by any country is
permitted. Concluding that torture is ajus cogens violation, the
court had no problem deciding that the actions of the Argentine officials, as alleged by the plaintiffs, were a notorious
violation ofjus cogens norms. The difficulty, found the court, is
that "we do not write on a clean slate ....We must interpret

the FSIA through the prism of Amerada Hess." 5 The Supreme Court, in Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping
Corp., had declared that immunity is only "granted in those

11. On March 12, 1984, the expropriation claims were dismissed sua sponte on
the basis of the Act of State doctrine. Siderman, 965 F.2d at 704. The Sidermans
moved for reconsideration of the court's dismissal of the expropriation claims. This
motion was denied on September 24, 1984, but a default judgment on the torture
claims was entered. The Sidermans were awarded a total of $2.7 million. De
Blake v. Republic of Argentina, No. CV 82-1772-RMT, 1984 WL 9080, at *3 (C.D.
Cal. Sept. 28, 1984).
12. The damages award finally prompted the Republic of Argentina to respond. They filed a motion for relief from judgment on the ground that they were
immune from suit under the FSIA. On March 7, 1985, the district court vacated
the default judgment and dismissed the Sidermans' action based on Argentina's
immunity under the FSIA. Siderman, 965 F.2d at 704. The Sidermans filed a
timely notice of appeal. Id. at 705.
13. Addressing the expropriations claims, the court cited De Sanchez v. Banco
Central de Nicaragua, 770 F.2d 1385, 1389 (5th Cir. 1985), which stated that,
"[b]ecause sovereign immunity is jurisdictional and the act of state defense is not,
we must consider sovereign immunity before reaching the act of state doctrine."
Therefore, the court addressed the jurisdictional issue first and found that the
Sidermans' allegations of jurisdiction by way of both the "commercial activity" and
the "international takings" exceptions of the FSIA were valid. In light of this, the
court remanded the expropriations claims to the district court in order to further
develop the factual record, and it gave plaintiffs leave to cure any jurisdictional
defects. Siderman, 965 F.2d at 722.
14. For a discussion of jus cogens norms and their application to Siderman de
Blake v. Republic of Argentina, see infra notes 165-66 and accompanying text.
15. Siderman, 965 F.2d at 718.
16. 488 U.S. 428 (1989).
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cases involving alleged violations of international law that do
not come within one of the FSIA's exceptions." 7 Thus, since
nothing in the text or legislative history of the FSIA specifically addresses the effect ofjus cogens on the issue of jurisdiction,
the Ninth Circuit reluctantly found that jurisdiction could not
be maintained on this basis.'"
III. RELEVANT LEGAL DoCmINE

A. Jus Cogens
Jus cogens literally means cogent law, 9 but this definition is insubstantial in the face of the vast body of legal thinking that has gathered around its precepts. As such, many
scholars have attempted to define jus cogens in a more substantive and thus useful way, but no standard definition has
emerged.
The most widely used, modern definition for jus cogens is
found in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.2" The
Vienna Convention defines jus cogens as a "peremptory norm
of general international law.., a norm accepted and recognized by the international community of states as a whole as a
norm from which no derogation is permitted .... .2 1 Various
17. Id. at 436. The Court was referring to the exceptions explicitly expressed
under 28 U.S.C. § 1605 (1988).
18. The issue of torture, though, was again remanded to ascertain whether
the Argentineans had impliedly waived their right to immunity by attempting to
use the United States courts to prosecute Josh Siderman. This is supported by the
legislative history of the FSIA, which, following an explanation of the implied
waiver provision of the FSIA, 28 U.S.C. § 1605 (1988), gave three examples of an
implied waiver:
With respect to implied waivers, the courts have found such waivers in
cases where a foreign state has agreed to arbitration in another country
or where a foreign state has agreed that the law of a particular country
should govern a contract. An implicit waiver would also include a situation where a foreign state has filed a responsive pleading in an action
without raising the defense of sovereign immunity.
H.R. REP. No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1976) [hereinafter HOUSE REPORT].
19. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LAN-

GUAGE (unabridged) 440 (1986) ("cogent: ... L. cogens, pres. part. of cogere to
drive together, collect, compel, having the power of compelling or constraining; ...
appealing persuasively to the mind or reason; .

.

. convincing.").

20. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May
23, 1969 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980) 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, reprinted in 8
I.L.M. 679 (1969) [hereinafter Vienna Convention).
21. Id. at art. 53. See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW
OF THE UNITED STATES § 102 cmt. k (1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT].
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human rights instruments have also used other terms when
referring to jus cogens norms which are now commonly seen.
For example, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights22
refers to inherent "dignity"23 when defining this principle,
while the American Convention on Human Rights24 refers to
certain25 essential rights which all nations are obligated to respect.

For the purpose of this Comment, the definition of jus
cogens expressed by Mr. Suarez, Mexican delegate to the United Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties, is most useful.
He declared that, "[the rules of jus cogens [are] those rules
which derive from principles that the legal conscience of mankind deem[s] absolutely
essential to coexistence in the interna26
tional community."
This notion of coexistence is not new. The classical system
of international law, first formulated by Grotius in the seventeenth century, incorporated rules that limited the independence of sovereign states in an effort to promote peaceful coexistence.2 ' This system was called the "law of nations," and it
was comprised of the divine law of revelation, natural law, and
custom. 2 8 By the late eighteenth century, the domestic appli-

cability of the "law of nations" was taken for granted, "adopted
[in England] in its full extent by the common law, and... held
to be a part of the law of the land."29 At that time, Blackstone
22. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217, U.N. GAOR, 3d
Sess., U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948) [hereinafter Universal Declaration].
23. Id. at art. I. Article I reads, "All human beings are born free and equal in
dignity and rights.. . ." Id.
24. American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969 (entered into force
July 18, 1978) O.A.S. Official Records OEA/Ser.K/XVII1.1, Doc. 65, Rev. 1, Corr. 1,
reprinted in 9 I.L.M. 673 (1970).
25. Id. at art. I. Article I lays out the format for the American Convention on
Human Rights, while the rest of the convention discusses the specific rights in
detail. It provides that "[p]arties to this Convention undertake to respect the
rights and freedoms recognized herein and to ensure to all persons subject to their
jurisdiction the free and full exercise of those rights and freedoms, without any
discrimination ... ." Id.
26. United Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties, 1st Sess. Vienna, Mar.
26 - May 24, 1968, U.N. Doc. A]CONF.39/1]/Add. 1 (1969) (statement of Mr.
Suarez (Mexico) at 294) [hereinafter Statement of Mr. Suarez].
27. See WOLFGANG G.
TIONAL LAW 60 (1964).

FRIEDMANN, THE

CHANGING STRUCTURE OF INTERNA-

28. EDWIN D. DICKINSON, THE EQUALITY OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 41
(1920).
29. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 66-67 (reprint 1775).
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described the "law of nations" as "a system of rules deducible
by natural reason and established byuniversal consent among
the civilized inhabitants of the world."3"
Jus cogens norms are at the top of the hierarchy of the
"law of nations." They function as a "very strong rule of customary international law,"3 ' acting as the "immutable" or
"necessary" law of nations.32 The difference between custom-ary laws that are considered peremptory and those that are
merely convenient rules of conduct among nations is that peremptory norms do not depend on the will of the governing
executive or legislative authority for their legality. 3 The con-

venient rules are referred to as jus dispositivum norms, and
their applicability is limited to those states consenting to be
governed by them, based merely on the self-interest of those
participating states.' Jus cogens norms, on the other hand,
are based on the idea of the good per se as derived from values
taken to be fundamental to the international community as a
whole.35 Since jus cogens norms are based on what the world
considers just, as opposed to what one particular nation considers just, no state may attempt to violate or alter jus cogens,
whereas jus dispositivum norms may be changed by a particular state's violation of them and subsequent encouragement of
36
other states to follow suit.

A most telling example of this distinction can be seen in
the conviction of Nazi war criminals following World War II in
Nuremberg, Germany. It appeared that those convicted were
being tried for acts which were "legal" in the defendants' state
at the time of their commission because they were acting under the laws of the sovereign. However, genocide is considered

30. Id.
31. ANTHONY A. D'AMATO, THE CONCEir OF CUSTOM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW

132 n.73 (1971).
32. 3 EMER DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS 346-47 (Joseph Chitty ed.
1852).
33. David F. Klein, Comment, A Theory for the Application of the Customary
International Law of Human Rights by Domestic Courts, 13 YALE J. INT'L L. 332,
351 (1988).
34. Alan Brudner, The Domestic Enforcement of International Covenants on
Human Rights: A Theoretical Framework, 35 U. TORONTO L.J. 219, 249-50 (1985).
35. Id. at 231.
36. Jonathan I. Charney, The Power of the Executive Branch of the United
States Government to Violate Customary InternationalLaw, 80 Am. J. INT'L L. 913,
914 (1986).
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a violation of jus cogens norms, and such acts can never be
made legal. It is not for any particular state to choose whether
or not it will abide byjus cogens. The very fact that a state is a
state implies acceptance; therefore, no authority other than
customary international law need be cited for prosecution of
those guilty of violating its precepts.
In this sense, jus cogens is a self-executing principle, because it does not need any implementing legislation in order
for the doctrine to operate. Normally, in order for domestic
courts to apply treaty law and other international rights established by express accord, the treaties must contain within
them the terms of their application. This can either be expressly stated through implementing legislation or by reference to
contextual factors found in the language and legislative history
of the norms involved.3 ' The fundamental idea is that there
be an intent to enforce them locally. If such an intent exists,
these agreements are regarded as self-executing and can thus
be implemented. By contrast, a claim based on a jus cogens
violation should be actionable independent of the signing of a
treaty or any intent to enforce them locally, since such a claim
asserts fundamental rights that are already generally accepted
by the world community.3 9

37. See Robert H. Jackson, Final Report to the President on the Nuremberg
Trials (Oct. 7, 1946) (cited in ROBERT H. JACKSON, THE NORNBERG CASE xiv-xv
(1947)). Justice Jackson writes:
[The trials] for the first time made explicit and unambiguous what was
theretofore, as the tribunal has declared, implicit in international law,
namely, that to prepare, incite, or wage a war of aggression . . . and
that to persecute, oppress, or do violence to individuals or minorities on
political, racial, or religious grounds in connection with such a war, or to
exterminate, enslave, or deport civilian populations, is an international
crime.
Id.
38. In People of Saipan v. United States Dep't of Interior, 502 F.2d 90, 99
(9th Cir. 1974), for example, the court held that domestically enforceable treaty
obligations could arise when the parties to the treaty expressed their will that
domestic means of enforcement be available. The contextual factors which they
cited to determine this were: a) "the purpose of the treaty and the objectives of
the creators"; b) "the existence of domestic procedures and institutions appropriate
for direct implementation"; c) "the availability and feasibility of alternate enforcement methods and long range social consequences of self or non-self exclusion." Id.
39. Cf Stefan Riesenfeld, The Doctrine of Self-Executing Treaties and United
States v. Postal.- Win at Any Price?, 74 AM. J. INT'L L. 892, 900-01 (1980). Professor Riesenfeld asserts that the self-execution of treaties is favored when they grant
rights to persons, when the parties lack discretion to fulfill any obligation, and
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Although much has been written on the "law of nations,"
jus cogens norms, as a subset of those laws, have not been fully
defined. Courts seeking to determine whether a norm of customary international law has attained the status of jus cogens
must look "to the customs and usages of civilized nations; and,
as evidence of these, to the works of jurists and commentators .... "4 0 In addition, it must be determined "whether the
international community recognizes the norm as one 'from
which no derogation is permitted."'' The Restatement lists
several examples of norms currently recognized as having
achieved peremptory status. It specifies that genocide, slave
trade, slavery, murder, torture, and systematic racial discrimination are all violations ofjus cogens norms.42
B.

The Problem of Sovereign Immunity

Although jus cogens norms are fundamental norms requiring no consent for their strict adherence,43 many nations use
the doctrine of sovereign immunity to argue that claims
against the sovereign for violations of peremptory norms cannot be adjudicated by another nation's courts. So, although no
derogation is permitted from jus cogens norms, this competing
doctrine makes it difficult for the principle of jus cogens to be
enforced on an international level. Lord Wilberforce stated the
problem succinctly when he remarked that sovereign immunity
"is a concept devised by lawyers in the 19th century [and] is
now being used by nations generally as a technique for denying compliance with obligations."'
Sovereign immunity refers to certain powers that states
claim for themselves in their mutual relations and the power
when no further congressional action is necessary to fulfill the treaty obligations.
An analogous argument can be seen with respect to jus cogens norms. Id.
40. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 880 (2d Cir. 1980) (quoting The
Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900)); see also DICKINSON, supra note 28
regarding the traditional composition of the "law of nations."
41. Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 715 (9th Cir.
1992) (quoting Committee of United States Citizens Living in Nicaragua v. Reagan, 859 F.2d 929, 940 (D.C. Cir. 1988)).
42. RESTATEMENT, supra note 21, § 702 cmt. n.
43. See Brudner, supra note 34, at 231.
44. Lord Wilberforce, Address to the Fifty-Eighth Conference of the International Law Association (1980), in INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION, REPORT OF
THE FIFTY-EIGHTH CONFERENCE 513, 515 (1980).
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to act without restraint on their freedom.45 It derives its power from the notion that "[e]very sovereign State is bound to respect the independence of every other sovereign State, and
[that] the courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the
acts 6of the government of another done within its own territo4
ry. ,
Though many countries, including the United States,47
adhere to the doctrine of sovereign immunity in their dealings
with other countries, many commentators question the role
that sovereign immunity should play in the post-World War II
world. "The traditional concept of sovereignty has become particularly inconsistent and outmoded in the present-day
world, 48 laments one academic, while another, more idealistic
academic has remarked that, "Only law is sovereign," 49 not
nations. And Sir Hersch Lauterpacht, arguably the dean of
modern international law doctrine, has proclaimed:
The science of international law, while recognising that it is
the business of international lawyers to expound law, as it is
and not as it should be, is now increasingly realizing that
dogmatic positivism as taught by a generation of priests
fascinated by the splendour of the doctrine of sovereignty is a
barren idea foreign both to facts and to the requirements of a
scientific system of law.50
At the heart of this erosion of the usefulness of sovereign
immunity is the expansion of the number of sovereign states
and the consequent "dilution of the homogeneity of values and
standards"5 that formed the foundation of classical international law. That is, unlike the homogeneity that characterized
the small group of white, Western European nations that
formed the principles of classical international law, today's

45. Ram P. Anand, Sovereign Equality of States in International Law, 197
RECUEIL DES CouRs 38 (1986).
46. Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897).
47. See Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90
Stat. 2891 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602-11 (1976)).
48. Anand, supra note 45, at 31.
49. Anand, supra note 45, at 38 (quoted in MAREK S. KOROWICz, Some Present
Aspects of Sovereignty in InternationalLaw, 102 COLLECTED COURSES 24-25 (1961-

I)).
50. HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, PRIVATE LAW SOURCES AND ANALOGIES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 51, 58 (1927).

51. See FRIEDMANN, supra note 27, at 6.
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states cut across the entire spectrum of social, economic, cul-

tural and political makeup.52 As a consequence, the family of
nations cannot depend upon all nations to apply international
norms domestically that were once universally accepted.53
Each community must exist according to its own cultural standards. However, the survival of each political community and
its capacity to develop according to its own preferences depends upon a minimal number of common norms to which all
members have allegiance. Thus, coexistence in today's heterogeneous society requires a limit on sovereign power, since
abuse of that power is no longer checked by cultural uniformity.
Jus cogens norms represent that limit, since, as asserted
by Mr. Suarez,54 they make coexistence possible. In addition,
as one professor contends, "if public international law wishes
'to transform itself from a primitive legal system into a highly
organized legal system, then international jus cogens must
develop."55 The clear way to implement such a limit would be
to waive sovereign immunity automatically with respect to the
claim being made whenever a sovereign nation has been accused of violating a jus cogens norm.
C. Jus Cogens Violation as a Waiver of Sovereign Immunity
Sovereign immunity cannot be applied when violations of
international law are involved. This was the conclusion of the
Judgment of the International Military Tribunal at
Nuremberg. In discussing sovereign immunity, they declared
that, "Th[is] principle of international law, which under certain
circumstances protects the representatives of a state, cannot be
applied to acts which are condemned as criminal by international law."56

52. Adda Bozeman, The International Order in a Multicultural World, in THE
EXPANSION OF INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY 387, 404 (Hedley Bull & Adam Watson
eds., 1984).

53. Id.
54. See Statement of Mr. Suarez, supra note 26 and accompanying text.
55. Eric Suy, The Concept of Jus Cogens in Public InternationalLaw, reprinted in PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS II THE CONCEPT OF JUS COGENS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, CONFERENCE ON INTERNATIONAL LAW LAGONISSI 71 (1967).

56. Judgment of the International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg 1946), reprinted in 41 AM. J. INTL L. 172, 221 (1947).
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Certainly, violations of jus cogens norms would preclude
the defense of sovereign immunity, since they consist of the

most heinous crimes in international law. In addition, modern
international law recognizes that a state act in violation of jus
cogens cannot even be recognized as a sovereign act." Thus, a
state that violates jus cogens cannot be accorded sovereign
immunity from adjudication, since the state was not acting
within its right as a sovereign nation at the time it committed
the act.5

Sir Hersch Lauterpacht broadened this notion by viewing
sovereign immunity more as the exception than the rule where
violations of international law are concerned. He contended
that "acts contrary to international law are invalid and cannot
become a source of legal rights for the wrongdoer."5 9 A grant
of sovereign immunity is not a convenient method by which a
state escapes punishment; it is a significant legal right. At
least one court has recognized this view, finding that immunity
should only be accorded in "clear" cases.6 ° The court based its
57. Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 718 (9th Cir.
1992). See also Suy, supra note 55, at 75 ("If an international jus cogens exists, it
must, indeed, make necessarily null and void any of those legal acts and actions
of States whose object is unlawful.").
58. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp. v. Argentine Republic, 830 F.2d 421, 425
(2d Cir. 1987) ("That international law currently denies immunity for violations of
international law is not surprising when one considers that international law consists primarily of rules guiding the conduct of nations. If sovereign acts were immunized today from scrutiny under international law, the exception would nearly
swallow the rule. For example . . . since the sinking of a neutral vessel on the
high seas without justification violates a substantive principle of international law,
no matter who does the sinking, there is no immunity under international law in
this case."). See also Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 457
(1963) (White, J., dissenting) ("The reasons for nonreview, based as they are on
traditional concepts of territorial sovereignty, lose much of their force when the
foreign act of state is shown to be a violation of international law. All legitimate
exercises of sovereign power . . . should be exercised consistently with the rules of
international law . . . ."); Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425
U.S. 682, 694 (1976) (An act of state is the "public act of those with authority to
exercise sovereign powers.").
Any act that violates peremptory norms of international law is done ultra
vires; it exceeds the scope of authority. An argument might be made that apparent
authority, or authority by virtue of the way the circumstance appears, instead of
true authority, would allow those relying on such authority to escape liability for
their acts on behalf of the sovereign. However, one can never claim apparent authority to do an illegal act.
59. HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, RECOGNITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 420 (1947).
60. Victory Transport, Inc. v. Comisaria General de Abastecimiento y
Transportes, 336 F.2d 354, 354 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 934 (1965).
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finding on the idea that a wrongdoer cannot be accorded special privileges, especially when such fundamental violations of
international law are involved. Sovereign immunity, after all,
is not based on precepts of natural law as is jus cogens. Sovereign immunity is based more on notions of comity and international courtesy.6 Nations that violate jus cogens norms
should not be granted a courtesy.
Furthermore, as one scholar has phrased the rule, "courts
have clearly recognized that the act of state defense will not
shield governmental acts that fail to meet a minimum standard of legality under the sovereign's own laws."62 Thus, the
inconsistency in granting immunity in the face of these violations is made even more striking when one considers that
violations of jus cogens norms are theoretically illegal under
the laws of every sovereign nation.
In sum, by granting immunity to a state that has violated
a rule of jus cogens, a court is recognizing a sovereign right
which, in effect, could not exist because the state is not acting
as a sovereign. By doing so, the court can be considered to be
sanctioning and promoting an act that is condemned by the

61. See infra notes 105-07 and accompanying text regarding "comity of nations."
62. Ronald G. Haron, Recent Developments: Alien Tort Claims Act, 27 VA. J.
INT'L L. 433, 443 (1987) (emphasis added). Note that the "act of state defense" is
not the same as the doctrine of sovereign immunity, though the theory behind
both is the same. An "act of state" is "an act done by the sovereign power of a
country, or by its delegate, within the limits of the power vested in him. An act
of state cannot be questioned or made the subject of legal proceedings in a court
of law." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 32 (5th ed. 1979). Sovereign immunity obliges
states to "respect the independence of every other sovereign state, and [espouses
that] the courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the acts of the government of another, done within its own territory." Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S.
250, 252 (1897). Thus, the two doctrines are very similar in effect, both preventing
domestic courts from adjudicating claims against foreign sovereigns concerning acts
done on their sovereign territory. The difference seems to lie in the fact that
[t]he act of state doctrine . . . is not a rule of international law, but a
domestic rule developed by the United States Supreme Court. It is a rule
of judicial self-restraint, not unlike other prudential rules of judicial selfrestraint. It may apply to foreign acts that raise no issues under international law.
Louis HENKIN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW 162 (2d ed. 1987). Thus, sovereign
immunity is a doctrine of international law that deals with the way countries
relate to one another, while the "act of state" defense deals with the way suits
that involve foreign sovereigns will be viewed in domestic courts. For purposes of
this explanation, however, they are used interchangeably. See also supra notes 4355 and accompanying text for a more thorough description of sovereign immunity.

19931

SIDERMAN de BLAKE v. ARGENTINA

981

international community. 63 Some might even argue that this
makes the court an "accomplice to the act,"' for "he who assists in the consummation of an illegal act must be treated as
a party to it. '65 Accordingly, domestic treatment of issues of
sovereign immunity must conform with modern standards of
international law. It must be found that when a state violates
a peremptory norm of international law, it has automatically
and impliedly waived all legal right to the benefits of sovereign
immunity. This waiver is not something to which a state
grants its consent. Rather, it is part of the premise of jus
cogens, whose adherence requires no consent by the individual
state, merely universal consent by the family of nations.6 6
D. JurisdictionOver Sovereign Nations
In order for a state to review the actions of another state,

it must have jurisdiction to do so. International law provides
principles that determine when this is the case. For example, a
domestic court may have jurisdiction under the territoriality or
objective territoriality principle,6 the nationality principle,68
the passive personality principle,69 or the protective princi-

63. Jordan J. Paust, Note, Federal Jurisdiction Over ExtraterritorialActs of
Terrorism and Nonimmunity for Foreign Violators of International Law Under the
FSIA and the Act of State Doctrine, 23 VA. J. INT'L L. 191, 248 (1983). The full
statement reads as follows:
For the judiciary to reverse these trends and grant immunity to violators
of international law would be to compromise its commitment to law, to
threaten its independence, and, in effect, to sanction and promote official
lawlessness that is otherwise condemned by the international community.
Such a result must not be allowed.
Id.
64. Adam C. Belsky et al., Note, Implied Waiver Under the FSIA: A Proposed
Exception to Immunity for Violations of Peremptory Norms of InternationalLaw, 77
CAL. L. REV. 365, 401 n.198 (1989).
65. F.A. Mann, The Doctrine of Jus Cogens in International Law, in FESTSCHRIFT FOR ULRICH SCHEUNER 415 (1973) (quoted in Belsky et al., supra note 64,
at 401 n.198).
66. See supra notes 29 and 34 and accompanying text regarding universal
consent to jus cogens norms.
67. The territoriality and objective territoriality principles apply to offenses
that occur within the state that is claiming jurisdiction or that intentionally have
effects within that state. HENKIN, supra note 62, at 828-29.
68. The nationality principle applies to cases where a court is trying to gain
jurisdiction over one who is a national of that state. RESTATEMENT, supra note 21,
§ 402 cmt. b.
69. The passive personality principle is the converse of the nationality princi-
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ple.7° However, none of these principles justify the jurisdiction of a domestic court to review violations that occur outside
the state by foreign nationals or sovereigns. This is the case
with many violations of peremptory norms. Thus, only the
"universality principle" would justify jurisdiction in such a
case, since under this principle, any nation is permitted "to
prosecute offenders for certain crimes even when the prosecuting nation lacks a traditional nexus
with either the crime, the
71
alleged offender, or the victim."

States originally developed this doctrine in order to gain
jurisdiction over those who had committed acts of piracy on the
high seas. The premise was that the pirate represented the
enemy of all people-hostis humani generis7 2 -and therefore
any state that captured the perpetrator was entitled to try and
punish the criminal on behalf of all nations of the world.73
Following the Second World War, the universality principle was expanded to include jurisdiction over wartime offenses,
including war crimes'4 and crimes against humanity,75 principally under the auspices of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg. 76 One scholar comments: "Nuremberg was
a watershed event that pointed international law towards a
more humane and enlightened interpretation and
applica77
tion ....It helped to revive universal jurisdiction."
In the wake of this movement, the United Nations drafted
its charter, 78 ' which made clear that in this modern age, a
pie. It applies to cases where a victim, who is a national of the state that is
claiming jurisdiction, is involved. See, e.g., United States v. Wright-Barker, 784
F.2d 161, 167 n.5 (3d Cir. 1986).
70. The protective principle is evoked when a particular offense threatens the
state's security or a basic governmental function. HENKIN, supra note 62, at 85556.
71. Kenneth C. Randall, Note, Universal Jurisdiction Under InternationalLaw,
66 TEx. L. REV. 785 (1988).

72. See, e.g., Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 890 (2d Cir. 1980).
73. RESTATEMENT, supra note 21, § 404.

74. War crimes included the mistreatment and murder of prisoners of war
and civilians in occupied territory. Randall, supra note 71, at 802-03.
75. Crimes against humanity usually involved the persecution and extermination of civilians, including nationals of the prosecuting state, on political, racial or
religious grounds. Randall, supra note 71, at 803.
76. See Steven Fogelson, Note, The Nuremberg Legacy: An Unfulfilled Promise,
63 S.CAL. L. REV. 833, 884-85 (1990), which declares that the "Nuremberg Charter effectively made Crimes Against Peace, War Crimes, and Crimes Against Humanity subject to universal jurisdiction."
77. Id. at 885.
78. Charter of the United Nations, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, T.S. 993, 3
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state's proper treatment of its own citizens is not simply a

matter of national concern, but international concern. Each
signatory state pledged to take action to promote such proper

treatment on an international level.79 And this multilateral
treaty was subsequently signed and ratified by most of the
world's nations, including the United States.8"
With that foundation, the doctrine of universal jurisdiction
has expanded to cover other human rights violations consid-

ered as heinous as the pirates and slave traders of old.8 ' In

fact, various postwar conventions have specifically addressed
the question of jurisdiction over offenses with which the prosecuting state has no connection. Most notable of the postwar
conventions that deal with this issue are the four Geneva Conventions of 1949.82 In discussing the Geneva Conventions,

Bevans 1153 (entered into force Oct. 24, 1945).
79. It provides, in part:
With a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well-being
which are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nathe United Nations shall promote .. . universal respect for,
tions ...
and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinctions as to race, sex, language or religion.
Id. at art. 55.
Article 56 goes on to provide that "[a]ll Members pledge themselves to take
joint and separate action in co-operation with the Organization for the achievement of the purposes set forth in Article 55." Id. at art. 56. See also Address by
President Jimmy Carter, supra note 1 and accompanying text.
80. See PETER H. RoHN, TREATY PROFILES 238 (1976).
81. See, e.g., Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 890 (2d Cir. 1980), which
declares that the "torturer has become-like the pirate and slave trader before
him-hostis humani generis, an enemy of all mankind."
82. There are four conventions that comprise the Geneva Conventions of 1949:
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick of
Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, T.I.A.S. No. 3362, 75
U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter Geneva Convention I]; Convention for the Amelioration of
the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of the Armed Forces at
Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, T.I.A.S. No. 3363, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter
Geneva Convention II]; Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War,
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, T.I.A.S. No. 3364, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Geneva Convention III]; Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in
Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, T.I.A.S. 3365, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Geneva Convention IV].
The Geneva Conventions all provide that '[elach party shall be under the
obligation to search for persons alleged to have committed, or to have ordered to
be committed, . . . grave breaches, and shall bring such persons, regardless of
their nationality, before its own courts. Geneva Convention I, supra at art. 49
(emphasis added); Geneva Convention II, supra at art. 50 (emphasis added); Geneva Convention III, supra at art. 129 (emphasis added); Geneva Convention IV,
supra at art. 146 (emphasis added).
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Professor Oscar Schachter of Columbia University posits:
"[T]he adoption of such a convention-under which state parties may voluntarily undertake to exercise jurisdiction in given
situations-implies that all states have the right to do so. It
follows that while nonparties have no obligation to exercise
jurisdiction, they have the right to exercise jurisdiction." 3
Such an assertion makes it clear that the widespread acceptance of the Geneva Conventions and other similar conventions
dealing with human rights confer a right of universal jurisdiction over certain offenses on all nations, not just on the parties
to the conventions.
These offenses, over which universal jurisdiction is encouraged by way of international conventions, overwhelmingly
involve jus cogens norms, such as apartheid,' torture,'
genocide," and terrorism. Furthermore, even though several of the documents granting universal jurisdiction for violations of jus cogens norms have not been ratified by each country, including the United States, they can be considered customary international law because of the widespread acceptance
that these conventions have received. Thus, it can be generalized that the current state of customary international law
provides for universal jurisdiction for offenses that involve
83. Randall, supra note 71, at 825 n.233 (quoting telephone interview with
Oscar Schachter, Professor of International Law and Diplomacy, Columbia University (May 7, 1987) (emphasis added)) [hereinafter Interview with Oscar Schachter].
84. International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime
of Apartheid, adopted Nov. 30, 1973 (entered into force July 18, 1976), 1015
U.N.T.S. 245, reprinted in 13 I.L.M. 50 (1974). Article V provides that violators
can be tried in a domestic tribunal of any state or by an international penal tribunal, and Article VI obliges state parties to adopt any measures necessary to
allow domestic jurisdiction.
85. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, adopted Dec. 10, 1984, G.A. Res. 39/46, U.N. GAOR,
39th Sess., Supp. No. 51, at 197, U.N. Doc. A/Res/39/51 (1985), reprinted in 23
I.L.M. 1027 (1984), as modified 24 I.L.M. 535 (1985) [hereinafter Torture Convention]. Article 5.3 provides for jurisdiction over any offender found in a state territory. Article 14 requires states to allow victim suits to redress torture, including
"an enforceable right to fair and adequate compensation."
86. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,
signed Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (entered into force Jan. 12, 1951) Article VI
provides for universal jurisdiction.
87. The Convention to Prevent and Punish Acts of Terrorism Against Persons
of International Significance, Feb. 2, 1971, 27 U.S.T. 3949, T.I.A.S. No. 8413. Article 5 of the Convention provides that when extradition for a convention crime is
not in order, the requested "state is obliged to submit the case to its competent
authorities, as if the act had been committed in its territory."
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violations of jus cogens norms. Under such a mandate, the
United States, for example, even if not a party to the specific
convention, is empowered to grant jurisdiction over violations
of jus cogens norms if Congress should choose to enact such
legislation.'
Finally, it is clear not only that the doctrine of universal
jurisdiction exists and that sovereign nations have a right to
use it under customary international law, but also as a family
of nations, customary international law obliges us to use it. It
is an obligation erga omnes-literally obligations flowing to all.
The International Court of Justice addressed this issue in
dictum to the Barcelona Traction case,89 finding that in contrast to a state's obligations "arising vis-a-vis another
State,.

.

. [obligations erga omnes] are the concern of all

States. In view of the importance of the rights involved, all
States can be held to have a legal interest in their protection."9 Hence, each state, according to this doctrine, is legally
obliged or compelled to protect certain rights, since all states
are interested parties. At a minimum, rights that are jus
cogens or "compelling"9 fall within this category, since the
international community has declared them to be the most
fundamental of all rights from which no derogation is permitted. Thus, under the erga omnes doctrine, each state has an
obligation to protect peremptory norms of international law
due to their shared interest in that protection. Assertion of
universal jurisdiction is an accepted method for protecting
those rights.
E. Private Cause of Action
The obligation to exercise universal jurisdiction can be
extended to a private cause of action, since a private cause of
action is at the heart of the doctrine of universal jurisdiction.
88. The courts of the United States may not assert jurisdiction without appealing to a domestic statute. See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 886 (2d
Cir. 1980).
89. In re Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co. (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J.
4 (Feb. 5).
90. Id. at 32. See also Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 890 (2d Cir.
1980) ("In the modern age, humanitarian and practical considerations have combined to lead the nations of the world to recognize that respect for fundamental
human rights is in their individual and collective interest.").
91. See supra note 19.
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That is, "if the individual human being and his nature are
taken as the starting point, then the rights and obligations of
man under international law receive a foundation independent
of the arbitrary will of states."92 Since universal jurisdiction is
premised on the idea that boundaries and notions of sovereignty lose their meaning when peremptory norms are violated,
such a triumph of the individual paves the way for recognition
and enforcement of universal jurisdiction. Such a view focuses
on the individual and his or her rights, not on arbitrary boundaries, in order to decide whether or not rights will be protected.
Some commentators have suggested that the International
Court of Justice's Barcelona Traction dictum

93

may have a

broader meaning than simply an interpretation of the erga
omnes doctrine. Its language gives sanction to a type of actio
popularis-a cause of action given to the people in general.94
Additionally, the Second Circuit in Filartiga recognized this
right of the individual when it held that the right to be free
from torture was a fundamental right enforceable by an individual in domestic courts.95 Individuals possess international
rights of their own "vis-a-vis their own governments." 9
Filartigamakes it clear that although the mechanism of government is still essential in achieving justice for human rights
violations, the government's political and economic needs may
have become secondary to that of the individual's need to pursue his cause of action. One commentator notes:

92. PETER P. REMIC, THE POSITION OF THE INDIVIDUAL IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
ACCORDING TO GROTIUS AND VATTEL 40 (1960).

93. In re Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co. (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J.
4 (Feb. 5).
94. Egon Schwelb, The Actio Popularis and International Law, ISR. Y.B. H.R.
46, 55-56 (1972).
95. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 885 (2d Cir. 1980). Note that the
court in Filartiga dealt with asserting jurisdiction over an individual, not a sovereign nation. Thus, although the court's recognition of the rights of the individual
and its ability to enforce those rights was an important declaration, the court's
method of asserting jurisdiction is not germane to this discussion. The Second
Circuit looked to the Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1988), to provide jurisdiction over the defendants, which only applies to cases involving individual defendants. 28 U.S.C. § 1330 (1988) governs actions against foreign states, and it is
part of the FSIA.
96. Id. at 885.
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[T]he emphasis of the law is increasingly shifting from the
formal structure of the relationships between states and the
delimitation of their jurisdiction to the development of substantive rules on matters of common concern vital to the
growth of an international community and to the individual
well-being of the citizens of its member-states. 97
In sum, the irreducible element becomes the sovereignty of the
individual, not the sovereignty of states.98

Jus cogens norms are at the forefront of this empowerment
of the individual, since violations of its norms represent the
most fundamental attacks on the individual's sovereignty interests. An individual must be free to guide his own destiny,
free from intolerable human rights abuses. Thus, at least with
respect to violations of peremptory norms, it can be asserted
that current trends in international law look towards the
granting of a private cause of action to the individual by way
of the doctrine of universal jurisdiction. Although the political
machinery might be slow to recognize this ultimate state in
which individuals will easily be able to assert their rights,
possibly before an international body, domestic courts can
bridge that gap by functioning as "double agents
(didoublement.fonctionnel) of both national and international
legal orders."9 9
IV.

A.

UNITED STATES LAW

Jus Cogens Norms In Domestic Law

The Supreme Court has held that the "law of nations" is
part of the "law of the land"; thus, the United States must
abide by these international norms.'0 0 In addition, Article I,

97. C. WILFRED JENKS, THE COMMON LAW OF MANKIND 17 (1958).

98. Hersch Lauterpacht, The Law of Nations, the Law of Nature and the
Rights of Man, 29 THE GROTIUS SOCIETY, 1, 29 (1944).
99. Kenneth C. Randall, Federal Questions and the Human Rights Paradigm,
73 MINN. L. REV. 349, 423 (1988). In referring to dddoublement fonctionnel, Professor Randall was making a reference to a term described by George Scelle which
deals with the dual and multiple functions played by single institutions in particular domestic and international contexts. See Georges Scelle, R~gles Gdndrales du
Droit de la Paix, in 46 RECUEIL DES COURS 1, 358-59, 421-27 (1933).
100. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) ("International law is part
of our law, and must be ascertained and administered by the courts of justice of
appropriate jurisdiction, as often as questions of right depending upon it are duly
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section 8 of the Constitution specifically authorizes Congress

"to define and punish.., offenses against the law of nations."'' Therefore, not only must the United States abide by
the "law of nations," as defined by Congress, but it is empowered by the Constitution to punish those who transgress such
laws. Violations of jus cogens norms, as a subset of violations
of the "law of nations," may thus be defined and punished by
Congress.
Congress has been slow to define specifically those acts
which violate the "law of nations" and thus slow to punish
foreign defendants under this authority. To compensate for
this reluctance and to create some basis for punishing foreign
defendants, the judiciary has stated that sources outside the
decrees of Congress may be used to determine the "law of nations."0 2 The Supreme Court has declared that the "law of
nations... may be ascertained by consulting the works of
jurists, writing professedly on public law; or by the general
usage and practice of nations; or by judicial decisions
recognising [sic] and enforcing that law."' 3 Therefore, although no official list of violations of the "law of nations," and
thus jus cogens norms, exists under United States law, a
framework is in place for ascertaining what would be accepted
in a domestic court.
B. Sovereign Immunity in the United States
In contrast to the infrequent references in the history of
United States jurisprudence which define the "law of nations,"
considerations of the doctrine of sovereign immunity are manifold. Most historians begin with the Supreme Court decision in
The Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon0 4 to find that absolute
immunity was the standard when this country was founded. In
granting sovereign immunity to France in a suit for possession
of a schooner, this 1812 case held that sovereign immunity was
presented for their determination."). See also The Nereide, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 388,
423 (1815) (U.S. courts are "bound by the law of nations which is part of the law
of the land."); Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 281 (1796) ("When the United
States declared their independence, they were bound to receive the law of nations,
in its modern state of purity and refinement.").
101. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10.
102. See United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153 (1820).
103. Id. at 160-61.
104. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812).
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not based on any particular rule of law or precedent, but merely on general principles of comity among nations. °5 This notion of comity was later defined by the Supreme Court as the
"recognition which one nation allows within its territory to the
legislative, executive, or judicial acts of another nation, having
due regard both to international duty and convenience, and to
the rights of its own citizens, or of other persons who are under the protection of its laws."' 6 It is a code of conduct which
hand,
is "neither a matter of absolute obligation, on the0 one
7
nor of mere courtesy and good will upon the other."
However, this doctrine was not so entrenched as some
claim. In 1794, eighteen years earlier than the decision in The
Schooner Exchange, the Attorney General recognized that in
appropriate cases, a foreign ship of war and its commander
were not immune.0 8 In addition, the United States government recently expressed concern that the opinion in The
Schooner Exchange was not being read properly. 0 9 The government noted that absolute immunity was not granted in that
case. It contended that "Chief Justice Marshall held that the
federal courts have the authority to adjudicate claims against
foreign governments, but that, in appropriate cases, they
should relinquish that power so as not to violate widely accepted principles of international law."' " 0 Thus, sovereign immunity was not as clear in every case in the history of this nation
as is maintained by supporters of the doctrine.
Nevertheless, whether clear or not, sovereign immunity
became an accepted part of domestic law. In fact, it became
such a familiar doctrine that eventually the Supreme Court
began taking a politicized view towards it rather than a legal
stance, placing less emphasis on whether immunity was sup-

105. Id. at 136.
106. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 164 (1895).
107. Id. at 163-64.
108. 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 47 (1794) (William Bradford Att'y Gen.). See also 1 Op.
Att'y Gen. 87 (1799) (Charles Lee Att'y Gen.) (absent a statutory provision, "it is
lawful to serve civil or criminal process upon a person on board a British ship-ofwar lying in" a United States harbor); The Santissima Trinidad, 20 U.S. (7
Wheat.) 283, 352 (1822) (Grounds for immunity were "not founded upon any notion
that a foreign sovereign had an absolute right.").
109. Brief for the United States of America as Intervenor and Suggestion of
Interest, Maritime Int'l Nominees Establishment v. Republic of Guinea, 693 F.2d
1094 (D.C. Cir. 1982), reprinted in 20 I.L.M. 1436 (1981).
110. Id. at 1461.
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ported by the law and practice of nations, and more on whether those making the decision were adhering to the practices
and policies of the State Department."' In response to this
problem, the State Department penned the famous Tate Letter
of 1952, which announced its adoption of the "restrictive" theory of sovereign immunity. 112 That is, foreign sovereigns are
immune from suits regarding their "public acts (jure imperii),"
but not in cases based on commercial or "private acts (jure
gestionis)." It was thought that this would bring our policies in
line with developments in international law."'
Because the Tate Letter left the power to grant sovereign
immunity in the hands of the executive branch, which is seemingly subject to diplomatic pressure," 4 Congress acted to
change the policy. Thus, in 1976, in an effort to cure this problem and "bring U.S. practice into conformity with that of most
other nations by leaving sovereign immunity decisions exclusively to the courts,"" ' the Legislature enacted the FSIA."

The FSIA codified the "restrictive" theory of sovereign immunity, placed the interpretation of the FSIA, and thus questions of
immunity, in the hands of the judiciary, and made it clear that
subject matter jurisdiction is lacking if sovereign immunity
exists." 7
It is apparent under most interpretations of the FSIA that
Congress was not very eager to grant United States court the
power to adjudicate the majority of claims that involve foreign
sovereigns, for the FSIA appears only to grant jurisdiction for
limited purposes. This is probably due to a fear of undermining
the "comity of nations, " "' as well s the notion that the sepa111. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 18, at 7. This trend "reached its culmination"
in Ex Parte Republic of Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 581 (1943) (reference is made to the
practice of judicial deference to "suggestions of immunity" from the executive
branch) and Mexico v. Hoffnan, 324 U.S. 30, 35-36 (1945).
112. Letter from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Advisor, Dep't. of State, to Acting
Attorney General Philip B. Perlman (May 19, 1952), in 26 DEPT. ST. BULL., Jan.
7, 1952, at 984-85.
113. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 18, at 7.
114. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 18, at 7-8.
115. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 18, at 75.
116. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat.
2891 (codifed at'28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602-11 (1976)).
117. 28 U.S.C. § 1330(a) (1988).
118. In Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 303-04 (1918), the Supreme Court stated that,
[tlhe principle that conduct of one independent government cannot be
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ration of powers would be disrupted by the courts interfering
with the agenda of the executive and legislative branches with
respect to foreign policy. That is, many of the issues that might
be brought before a domestic court might have an impact on
relations between the United States and the alleged violating
nation and thus may infringe upon areas traditionally left to
the other branches of government." 9 However, as judicial
bodies, the courts have leeway to interpret the FSIA liberally
or conservatively, as they see fit in a particular circumstance,
and these interpretations, more than the precise language of
the FSIA or considerations of foreign policy, establish the limits or scope of the FSIA.
C. Jus Cogens as an Exception to the PSIA
The FSIA must be read by courts to deny immunity when
ajus cogens violation is alleged to have occurred. This reading
must be so whether or not Congress specifically made reference
to jus cogens norms in the FSIA.

successfully questioned in the courts of another..

rests at last upon

the highest considerations of international comity and expediency. To permit the validity of the acts of one sovereign State to be reexamined and
perhaps condemned by the courts of another would very certainly "imperil the amicable relations between governments and vex the peace of nations."
(citation omitted). But cf William F. Webster, Amerada Hess Shipping Corp. v.
Argentine Republic: Denying Sovereign Immunity to Violators of International Law,
39 HASTINGS L.J. 1109 (1988). Webster comments that the effect on comity of a
grant of immunity would be positive. He states, "The effect on foreign relations
would, for the most part, be positive, since the United States would be demonstrating its commitment to international order and stability and to the development of an international legal order in areas of emerging importance." Id. at 1146.
119. To this end, the Supreme Court elucidated a test in Banco Nacional de
Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964), for deciding whether or not an action
should be dismissed on the ground that it will unduly interfere with United States
foreign policy. Id at 428. The test requires balancing three factors: 1) the degree
of codification or consensus regarding the applicable international legal principles,
2) the significance of the issue for United States foreign policy relations, and 3)
the status of the government whose act is under question. Id.; see also Amicus
Curiae Brief by the United States Department of Justice and State at 22-23,
Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980) (No. 79-6090) (This brief
looked to foreign policy considerations for deciding whether or not to grant a cause
of action, as it points out that since there was a clear violation of international
law, "a refusal to recognize a private cause of action in these circumstances might
seriously damage the credibility of our nation's commitment to the protection of
human rights.").
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As the codification of the policy of the United States government towards sovereign immunity, the FSIA was important
legislation, but its enactment did not signal an end to uncertainty over questions of immunity. It merely shifted the burden to the courts, leaving the same questions unanswered. The
significance of the FSIA is not that it assimilates established
precedent and custom with current international norms such
that every situation that might then arise will precisely conform to an intended standard, but that a body, free from political and economic pressure, may now draw upon all available
doctrines to arrive at an equitable answer. The FSIA provides
a procedural framework, and it is left to the judiciary to give
the FSIA breadth and scope.
The text of the FSIA does not resolve how sovereign immunity will be reconciled with the principle of jus cogens. The
problem is that sovereign immunity rests on the foundation
that sovereign states are equal and independent; 2 ' therefore,
they are not bound to abide by international law absent their
consent. Jus cogens norms, however, require no individual
consent in order to make them binding on all states.' In a
sense, the "general will of the international community of
states [takes] precedence over the individual wills of states to
order their relations."'22 The very existence of jus cogens is a
boundary on state sovereignty. It must be so in order to maintain minimum standards of coexistence.
Thus, ajus cogens exception must be read into the FSIA in
light of the tenet of statutory construction uttered almost two
hundred years ago by Chief Justice Marshall: "[An act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations,
if any other possible construction remains. " "' Since international law would hold that a country has waived all rights to
sovereign immunity by violating a jus cogens norm, the FSIA
must be construed in line with this principle. Arguably, immunity could only be granted if Congress specifically accorded
immunity for such a violation. Since Congress did not in any

120. The Schooner Exch. v. M'Faddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 136-37 (1812).
121. See Brudner, supra note 34, at 231.
122. Mary E. Turpel & Philippe Sands, Peremptory International Law and
Sovereignty: Some Questions, 3 CONN. J. INT'L L. 364, 365 (1988).
123. Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 578 (1953) (citing Murray v. The
Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804)).
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way address the issue ofjus cogens in the statute, it is tenable
that the FSIA denies immunity for all violations of jus cogens
norms.
Indeed, it seems unlikely that by way of the FSIA, Congress was looking to expand the scope of sovereign immunity
to violations of international human rights law. Prior to the
enactment of the FSIA, foreign sovereigns were in the position
of requesting immunity from the State Department. 124 The
political and diplomatic problems inherent in allowing State
Department policy to guide decisions of immunity were remedied by the enactment of the FSIA. Its three purposes'25
were: 1) to incorporate the "restrictive" theory of sovereign
immunity into United States law, which denied immunity for
"commercial or private" sovereign acts;126 2) to place these
decisions in the hands of the judiciary, rather than the executive branch, in order to insure that the decisions would be
made on legal grounds and under procedural due process; and,
3) to codify the procedures required to bring suit against a
foreign sovereign. These purposes were tailored to resolve the
immunity problems of the post-World War II years, not to
expand immunity to areas never before covered. Specifically,
no mention of human rights issues is ever made in the legislative history of the FSIA. This is highlighted when one considers the great extent to which127commercial concerns were addressed throughout the FSIA.

Thus, any interpretation of the FSIA as an act which expands the cloak of immunity to cover human rights violations
is ill-founded. This is especially manifest when one considers
that a "central premise" of the FSIA was that "decisions on
claims by foreign states to sovereign immunity are best made
by the judiciary on that basis of a statutory regime which in-

124. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 18, at 9. Due to the awkward position in
which this puts both the violating country and the United States, questions of
immunity were uncertain. In addition, requests by the United States for sovereign
immunity in foreign courts frequently failed to the point that by the 1960s the
United States attempted to invoke immunity in few cases. See HOUSE REPORT,
supra note 18, at 9.
125. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 18, at 7.
126. See supra note 112-13 and accompanying text regarding the "restrictive"
theory of sovereign immunity.
127. See infra notes 151-52 and accompanying text regarding FSIA's focus on
commercial activity.
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corporates standards recognized under international law. 128
A- denial of sovereign immunity for violations of jus cogens
129
norms is an accepted principle under international law.
Thus, any interpretation that grants immunity for violations of
jus cogens norms not only ignores the circumstances surrounding the enactment of the FSIA, but also flouts its basic premise.
Simply stated, the FSIA should be interpreted to read that
a party impliedly waives his sovereign immunity if he commits
acts which violate peremptory norms. Since no act of Congress
can be read in a way that violates international law, and international law is the "law of the land," 130 the FSIA must incorporate standards of international law. And since international
law would deny a.state immunity for violations of jus cogens
norms,' 3 ' the language of the FSIA must be interpreted to
create the mechanism for denying immunity. 3 2 Section
1605(a)(1) of the FSIA states that "A foreign state shall not be
immune from the jurisdiction of courts of the United States or
of the States in any case in which the foreign state has waived
its immunity either explicitly or by implication."' 33 Thus, the
implementing language is already present in the FSIA for an
implied waiver of immunity under circumstances of a violation
of peremptory norms.
Furthermore, Congress refuses to accord sovereign immunity when torts occur in the United States, as demonstrated in
section 1605(a)(5) of the FSJA. 34 Thus, from a common sense
128. HousE REPORT, supra note 18, at 14 (emphasis added).
129. See supra notes 43-55 and accompanying text regarding sovereign immunity.
130. See The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900).
131. Since a jus cogens violation is not a sovereign act, it will not be accorded
sovereign immunity. See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
132. One commentator has gone so far as to propose an amendment to §
1605(a)(1) of the FSIA which provides that a party implicitly waives sovereign
immunity if it commits acts which violate international law. For purposes of the
amendment, a "violation of international law" is interpreted as a "violation of a
rule of international law that is universally accepted among civilized nations."
That is essentially the definition of a jus cogens norm. The proposed amended §
1605(a)(1) would, in pertinent part, read as follows: "A foreign state shall not be
immune from the jurisdiction of the United States Courts . . . in any case . . . in
which the foreign state has impliedly waived its immunity by committing an act
which violates international law." Webster, supra note 118, at 1133.
133. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat.
2891 (codifed at 28 US.C. §§ 1330, 1602-11 (1976)).
134. 28 U.S.C. § 1605 (1988) reads:
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approach to section 1605 of the FSIA, there should be no basis
for finding sovereign immunity in those cases where the same
tortious act occurs outside the territory of the United
States.13 5 A sovereign that commits a tortious act should not
be granted immunity under the FSIA no matter where that act
occurs.
Another basis for implying a waiver within the FSIA
framework is the fact that the FSIA may not preempt "applicable international agreements."1 36 This means that any international agreement that conflicts with the FSIA will result in
a dismissal of the immunity provisions of the FSIA where that
agreement is concerned. It can be argued that such agreements
include norms of current international law that, as the "law of
nations,"" ' bind the United States. In this case, since the notion that states are not immune from jurisdiction for violations
of jus cogens norms is internationally agreed upon, it acts as a
codified international agreement. Thus, any interpretation of
the FSIA which does not take this international agreement
into account arguably has violated an underlying premise of
the FSIA.
Finally, although only Congress may grant a domestic
court jurisdiction over violations of jus cogens norms, the doctrine of universal jurisdiction138 can lend support to a finding

A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts of the
United States or of the states in any case .. . in which money damages
are sought against a foreign state for personal injury or death, or damage to or loss of property, occurring in the United States and caused by
the tortious act or omission of that foreign state or of any official or

employee of that foreign state while acting within the scope of his office
or employment ....
135. Belsky et al., supra note 64, at 400-01.
136. HoUSE REPORT, supra note 18, at 17. The "international agreements" exception is codified in 28 U.S.C. § 1604. A discussion of the "international agreements" exception is beyond the scope of this paper; however, it should be noted
that such an interpretation of the exception has not yet been accepted. The courts
have taken a narrow view on this issue, referring to it as the "existing treaty
exception," rather than the "international agreements exception." See, e.g.,
Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 719 (9th Cir. 1992),
cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 1812 (1993). The courts have interpreted the exception to
refer to international agreements that specifically provide private causes of action
to a plaintiff in direct violation of the FSIA. See, e.g., id. at 719.
137. See supra notes 100-01 and accompanying text regarding the adoption of
the "law of nations" as the "law of the land."
138. See supra notes 71-91 and accompanying text regarding universal jurisdiction.
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of implied waiver of sovereign immunity. The judiciary is free
to draw upon international legal principles of jurisdiction to
determine whether an implied waiver of sovereign immunity is
justified,'39 as long as it appeals to a domestic statute to exercise that jurisdiction. The United States has recognized the
doctrine of universal jurisdiction as an international law principle in numerous cases. 40
D. The Amerada Hess Decision and its Distinguishability
From Cases Involving Jus Cogens Norms
The Supreme Court addressed the scope of the FSIA in its
recent decision in Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp.' Although later courts have interpreted the
Court's holding in this case to have comprehensively defined
the scope of the FSIA, the logic behind its arguments points to
a more limited use. The decision appears to support the notion
139. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) ("International law is part
of our law, and must be ascertained and administered by the courts of justice of
appropriate jurisdiction, as often as questions of right depending upon it are duly
presented for their determination."). See also, The Nereide, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 388,
423 (1815) (U.S. courts are "bound by the law of nations which is part of the law
of the land."); Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 281 (1796) ("When the United
States declared their independence, they were bound to receive the law of nations,
in its modern state of purity and refinement.").
140. See, e.g., Von Dardel v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 623 F. Supp.
246, 254 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (The court made reference to the concept of universal
jurisdiction and then proclaimed that, "[t]he reasons for nonreview . . . lose much
of their force when the foreign act of state is shown to be a violation of international law' ....
." (quoting Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398,
457 (1964) (White, J., dissenting)). (The concept of extraordinary judicial jurisdiction over acts in violation of significant international standards has also been
embodied in the principle of 'universal' violations of international law [which] ...
extends to the enforcement of civil law.") (citation omitted); Tel-Oren v. Libyan
Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 781, 788 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (per curiam) (Edwards, J.,
concurring) (made several references to domestic jurisdiction over extraterritorial
offenses under the universality principle), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1003 (1985);
Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 890 (2d Cir. 1980) (made reference to the
torturer as being hostis humani generis, the enemy of all mankind, which is the
term used to justify universal jurisdiction over acts of piracy); In re Demjanjuk,
612 F. Supp. 544, 555 (N.D. Ohio) (the court determined that Israel's jurisdiction
to prosecute a concentration camp guard "conforms with the international law
principle of 'universal jurisdiction.'"), affd sub nom. Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 776
F.2d 571 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1016 (1986); and United States v.
Layton, 509 F. Supp. 212, 223 (N.D. Cal.) (recognizing universal jurisdiction to
define and punish terrorist acts against internationally protected persons), appeal
dismissed, 645 F.2d 681 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 972 (1981).
141. 488 U.S. 421 (1989).

1993]

SIDERMAN de BLAKE v. ARGENTINA

997

that since the FSIA's entire focus is on commercial concerns, it
is more akin to suits involving violations of jus dispositivum

norms than jus cogens norms."'
The plaintiff in Amerada Hess was a shipping corporation
that sent an empty oil tanker in May 1982 from the Virgin
Islands to Alaska. Although this was during the war between
Great Britain and Argentina over the Falkland Islands,
both of the warring parties were notified of the tanker's presence and purpose. Off the Argentine coast, but well in international waters, the tanker was attacked by Argentine aircraft
and, though not destroyed, eventually had to be tanked off the
coast of Brazil. 4 4 While the Second Circuit found that the attack of a neutral ship in international waters without apparent
justification was a clear violation of international law, 45 the
Supreme Court found Argentina to be immune from suit under
the FSIA.
This holding made clear that immunity would still be
granted where violations of international norms had occurred.
However, the type of violation in Amerada Hess is distinguishable from a jus cogens violation. Under no interpretation of
international law would attacking a ship rise to the level ofjus
cogens, since it is not part of the customarily accepted class of
norms from which no derogation is permitted. 4 6 It is merely
a violation of jus dispositivum norms or rules of international
conduct. 47 Thus, although it is debatable whether the Supreme Court was just in granting immunity to Argentina, any
court seeking to apply the same interpretation to cases involvingjus cogens norms would be basing its analysis on an inter-

142. For a comparison of the two doctrines, see supra notes 33-36 and accompanying text.
143. The Falklands are known as Islas Malvinas to the Argentineans.
144. Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 432
(1989).
145. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp. v. Argentine Republic, 830 F.2d 421, 426
(2d Cir. 1987) (ilTihe sinking of a neutral vessel on the high seas without justification violates a substantive principle of international law, no matter who does
the sinking . .
").
146. For a general discussion of what jus cogens is and what violations would
be considered violations of jus cogens norms, see supra notes 19-42 and accompanying text.
147. See supra notes 33-36 and accompanying text regarding jus dispositivum
norms.
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pretation of the FSIA that did not address such serious violations.
The fundamental difference between the two types of international law violations justifies the granting of immunity in
one case but not the other. Jus cogens norms require no consent for their adherence, while jus dispositivum are only adhered to at the will of the sovereign. Thus, when a nation
violates jus dispositivum, there is apparent justification for
denying the assertion of jurisdiction over that nation in domestic courts, since international customary law is not forcing
them to abide by certain norms, it is only encouraging them.
When the violation reaches the level ofjus cogens, that justification falls away, since no nation has a choice about whether
or not to comply with those norms.
In Amerada Hess, the Supreme Court failed to address any
distinction between jus cogens and jus dispositivum norms in
finding that the FSIA was meant to apply to all violations of
international law. The Court found that since Congress specifically referred to certain violations of international law in the
waiver section of the FSIA,"4 ' the FSIA was intended to cover all violations of international law within its scope. By example, the Court cited section 1605(a)(3), 49 which refers to "property taken in violation of international law," as justification for
finding that "Congress had violations of international law by
foreign states in mind when it enacted the FSIA."' 5 ° The
Court then concluded that since Congress intended to encompass international law within its scope, any state accused of a
violation of international law will be immune from suit in
United States courts if no specific exemption is made by Congress in the FSIA. The Court's major rationale for interpreting

148. 28 U.S.C. § 1605 (1988).
149. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3) reads:
A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts of the
United States or of the State in any case in which rights in property
taken in violation of international law are in issue and that property or
any property exchanged for such property is present in the United States
in connection with a commercial activity carried on in the United States
by the foreign state; or that property or any property exchanged for such
property is owned or operated by any agency or instrumentality of the
foreign state and that agency or instrumentality is engaged in a commercial activity in the United States.
150. Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 435
(1989).
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the FSLA in the way that it did was thus primarily based on a
jus dispositivum argument, since the taking of property does
not rise to the level of peremptory status. One can deduce that
since the Court refers to a jus dispositivum example in its
holding and jus cogens violations are so fundamentally disparate from jus dispositivum violations, the Court's holding was
impliedly limited to cases involvingjus dispositivum norms.
Additionally, the exceptions to sovereign immunity denoted under the FSIA deal almost exclusively with commercial
activity.' 51 The entire international focus of the FSIA is on
international commercial activity, not on international human
rights violations. This fact is apparent from the "Statement" of
the FSIA, 52 which cites as an important reason for creating
the FSIA the fact that "American citizens are increasingly
coming into contact with foreign states and entities owned by
foreign states," and that "these interactions arise in a variety
of circumstances,...

call[ing] into question whether our citi-

zens will have access to the courts in order to resolve ordinary
legal disputes." As examples of such instances, the "Statement"
of the FSIA looks not to human rights violations, but first to
the American businessman who sells goods to foreign trading
companies, and second to the seller of real estate who sells
property to a foreign government entity. Therefore, although
the Court made a case for finding that violations of jus
dispositivum norms, especially with regard to commercial activity, fall within the FSIA's purview, its analysis and the
legislative history make it clear that neither it nor Congress
considered violations ofjus cogens norms.
Thus, whether or not the Supreme Court adequately supported its decision to grant immunity from suit for a violation
of jus dispositivum norms, 53 it is apparent that any application of the Supreme Court's decision in Amerada Hess to violations of peremptory norms of international law would be an
arbitrary use of case law that is distinguishable. The courts
must still apply domestic precedent, custom, and current standards of international law in reaching their conclusions con-

151. 28 U.S.C. § 1605 (1988). The one major exception to this is § 1605(a)(5)
which deals with private torts.
152. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 18, at 6-8. See also Klein, supra note 33, at

359.
153. Such a discussion is beyond the scope of this Comment.
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cerning application of the FSIA where violations of jus cogens
norms are involved. In light of this, any attempt to limit the
FSIA's exceptions for all time to those specified in section 1605
would be fundamentally flawed.
V. ANALYSIS OF SIDERMAN DE BLAKE V. REPUBLIC OF ARGENTINA

Armed with this understanding of current principles of
international law and their relation to domestic application, I
now turn to a discussion of the recent Ninth Circuit decision in
Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina. In Siderman, the
court properly interpretedjus cogens, holding that the Republic
of Argentina's alleged torture of Jos6 Siderman represented a
fundamental violation of those norms. Based on this finding,
the court was obliged to grant jurisdiction to the plaintiffs
under the FSIA and customary international law. Nevertheless, it granted immunity to the Republic of Argentina. The
court based this finding on the holding in Argentine Republic v.
Amerada Hess Shipping Corp.,'5 4 but Siderman is easily distinguished from Amerada Hess. Thus, the court erred in its
determination that the FSIA granted immunity from judicial
review to the Republic of Argentina.
A.

Torture as a Violation of Jus Cogens

Torture is defined in part as "any act, directed against an
individual in the offender's custody or physical control, by
which severe pain or suffering. . . , whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on that individual for such purposes as ...discrimination."'55 It is universally condemned. It is
not only prohibited in the Constitution of the United
States156 but, according to one survey, by the Constitutions of

154. Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 718-19 (9th
Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1812 (1993).
155. See 137 CONG. REC. H11,244-04 (daily ed. Nov. 25, 1991) (provision of the
Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, as read by the Clerk); see also Torture
Convention, supra note 85, at art. 1 for similar language.
156. "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor
cruel and unusual punishment inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII, XIV. During a
debate in the House of Representatives, Representative Fascell conveyed the enmity American society feels towards torture: "Torture is a . . . violation of international law. But more important than being a violation of any laws, torture like
murder, is a violation of the very nature and fabric of human society." 134 CONG.
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fifty-five nations.'57 Likewise, all major human rights agreements and instruments contain a prohibition against torture 5 ' and permit no derogation from this norm 9 Some
treaties even encourage universal jurisdiction over claims of
torture. 60 As such, the right to be free from torture rises to
the level of a jus cogens norm, 161 since jus cogens norms
are
62
permitted.
is
derogation
no
which
from
those
essentially
Nevertheless, the universal condemnation of torture is
only the case in theory, not necessarily in practice. The reality
is that more than one-third of the world's governments "engage
in, condone, or encourage systematic torture."163 One con-

gressman has stated that "In the last decade alone, hundreds
of thousands of people have been killed by state authorities,

REC. H9692-02 (daily ed. Oct. 5, 1988) (statement of Rep. Fascell).
157. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 884 n.12 (2d Cir. 1980) (citing 48
REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT PENAL Nos. 3 & 4, at 208 (1977)).
158. See, e.g., Universal Declaration, supra note 22, at art. 3; American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S. Official Records OEA/Ser.
K/X II1.1, Doc. 65, Rev. 1, Corr. 1, reprinted in 9 I.L.M. 673 (1970), art. 5 (entered into force July 18, 1978); International Convention on Civil and Political
Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, reprinted in 6 I.L.M. 368 (1967), art. 5
(entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) [hereinafter International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights]; European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, Europ. T.S. No. 5, art. 3
(entered into force Sept. 3, 1953); African (Banjul) Charter on Human and People's
Right, June 27, 1981, O.A.U. Doc. CAB/LEG67/3 rev. 5, reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 58
(1982), art. 5 (entered into force Oct. 21, 1986); Declaration of the Rights of the
Child, G.A. Res. 1386 (XIV), U.N. GAOR, 14th Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 19, U.N.
Doc. A/4354 (1959), principle 9; Code of Conduct of the United Nations for Law
Enforcement Officials, G.A. Res. 34/169, U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., Supp. No. 46, at
185, U.N. Doc. A/34/46 (1980), art. 5; International Convention on the Elimination
of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 660 U.N.T.S. 195, reprinted in 5 I.L.M. 352
(1966), art. 5 (entered into force Jan. 4, 1969); and Principles of Medical Ethics,
G.A. Res. 3/194, U.N. GAOR, 37th Sess., Supp. No. 51, at 510, U.N. Doc. A/37/51
(1983), principle 2.
159. All of the documents cited supra note 158 contain such a provision. See,
e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 158, at art.
4.
160. See, e.g., Torture Convention, supra note 85. Article 5.3 provides for jurisdiction over any offender found in a state territory. Article 14 requires states to
allow victim suits to redress torture, including "an enforceable right to fair and
adequate compensation."
161. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT, supra note 21, § 702 cmt. n.
162. See Vienna Convention, supra note 20.
163. See 137 CONG. REc. E1444-02 (daily ed. April 24, 1991) (statement of Rep.
Yatron).
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and thousands more have been
persecuted and intimidated
1 64
into silence through torture."

The only way to combat such heinous acts is to bring these
governments to task for their crimes. It is clear that mere
assertions of good intent will not enforce established norms of
international law. Indeed, it is hypocritical under the weight of
these facts, and in light of torture's status as a violation ofjus
cogens norms, to simply expect documents to ameliorate the
situation. Recognizing the horrifying implications of the pervasiveness of torture, the Ninth Circuit in Siderman de Blake v.
Republic of Argentina165 easily found that the systematic torture of Jos6 Siderman was a violation of jus cogins norms.'66
However, the court maintained the trend toward good intent
but little action by interpreting the FSIA to grant immunity in
spite of the fact that a violation of such peremptory norms was
involved. The court's mistake was that such an interpretation
essentially leaves the enforcement of these norms to nonexistent bodies.
Beyond the deceptively simple reason for denying immunity-that instances of torture must be thwarted-is the idea
that accepted principles of international law deny immunity for
violations of jus cogens norms. The Ninth Circuit's narrow
interpretation ignores these principles in favor of outdated
notions of state sovereignty. Thus, with the weight of a jus
cogens violation bearing down on the court, the Ninth Circuit
was obliged to deny immunity to the Republic of Argentina and
hear the plaintiffs' complaint.
B. Allowing the Sidermans' Torture Claims To Be Adjudicated
in United States Courts
As a defense to Jos6 Siderman's allegations of torture in
Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, the Republic of
Argentina raised the shield of the FSIA in order to avoid the
jurisdiction of the United States' courts. 167 The Ninth Circuit
accepted this defense, basing its interpretation of the FSIA on

164. Id.
165. 965 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1812 (1993).
166. The Ninth Circuit held that, "Cu]nder international law, any state that
engages in official torture violates jus cogens." Id. at 717.
167. Id. at 804.
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that established by the Supreme 8Court in Argentine Republic
v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp.16
Although Amerada Hess dealt with interpreting the scope
of the FSIA, it offered an interpretation based on a violation of
jus dispositivum norms, not on jus cogens norms, such as the
torture claim in Siderman.169 Amerada Hess involved the attack of a neutral ship in international waters without apparent
justification. Such an act is a clear violation of international
law; however, under no interpretation of international law
would such a violation rise to the level of jus cogens.' °
Siderman, on the other hand, deals with the problem of systematic torture, which is at the top of the hierarchical pyramid
of violations 17' and is a well-accepted violation of jus cogens
norms.1 2 Thus, the Amerada Hess decision is distinguishable
on its facts, and its interpretation of the FSIA is not applicable
when violations of jus cogens norms are involved. 7 3 The
Ninth Circuit's mistake in Siderman was not in its interpretation of the Amerada Hess decision, but in its decision to base
its holding on a case that dealt with a fundamentally different
situation and different international norms.
The decision in the Amerada Hess case seems to be the
only reason that the court decided the way that it did in
Siderman. The court admits that, although Argentina would
not be granted immunity under international law, it "must
74
interpret the FSIA through the prism of Amerada Hess."
This is particularly erroneous in light of the fact that the legislature, in deciding to place the question in the hands of the
judiciary by enacting the FSIA, specified that one important

168. 488 U.S. 428 (1989).
169. See supra notes 141-53 and accompanying text regarding an analysis of
the Court's decision in Amerada Hess.
170. For a general discussion of what jus cogens is and what violations would
be considered violations ofjus cogens norms, see supra notes 19-42 and accompanying text.
171. Theodor Meron, On a Hierarchy of InternationalHuman Rights, 80 AM. J.
INT'L L. 1, 2 (1986).
172. See supra notes 155-66 and accompanying text regarding torture as a violation of jus cogens norms.
141-53 and accompanying text regarding the
173. See supra notes
distinguishability of the Amerada Hess decision from cases involving jus cogens

norms.
174. Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 718 (9th Cir.
1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1812 (1993).
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guideline in doing so is that standards under international law
must be incorporated when interpreting the statute.'75 Thus,
if Amerada Hess is the court's only reason for granting immunity, in the face of all the legal arguments put forth that deny
immunity, then the Ninth Circuit has failed to support its
holding.
Rather than relying on the specific exceptions in section
1605 of the FSIA, the Ninth Circuit was obliged to look to the
implied waiver exception, codified in section 1605(a)(1) of the
FSIA. 7 6 By way of this exception, sovereign immunity should
automatically be waived when a state is accused of having
violated a jus cogens norm. This waiver is premised on the
notion that since violations of jus cogens norms are, by their
nature, not sovereign acts, a sovereign nation impliedly waives
its immunity when it commits such an act. 177 Since the
Ninth Circuit recognizes that "no state claims a sovereign right
to torture its own citizens" 7 8 and that under international
law, a state that commits torture "would not be entitled to...
immunity,"1 79 the court has already made the necessary find-

ings to invoke the "implied waiver" provision of the FSIA. In
addition, such an interpretation of the FSIA, argues one commentator, 8 ' would be in accordance with the first purpose of
the legislature in enacting the FSIA--"to codify the so-called
'restrictive' principle of sovereign immunity, as presently recognized under international law."'' That is, since the restrictive theory only grants immunity for public acts and "governments do not generally commit torture as a matter of public
policy,"8

2

it follows, in theory, that they should not be im-

175. See supra notes 128-29 and accompanying text regarding the fact that the
judiciary must use international law to interpret the FSIA.
176. See supra note 132-33 and accompanying text regarding an implied waiver
exception based on 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1) (1988).
177. See supra notes 56-66 and accompanying text regarding international principles which deny sovereign immunity to one who violates jus cogens norms.
178. Siderman, 965 F.2d at 717.
179. Id. at 718.
180. Matthew H. Murray, Note, The Torture Victim Protection Act: Legislation
to Promote Enforcement of the Human Rights of Aliens in U.S. Courts, 25 COLUM.
J. TRANSNAT'L L. 673 (1987).
181. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 18, at 7.
182. Murray, supra note 180, at 706. It might be argued that since Argentina
had just experienced a coup d'etat which resulted in the assumption of power by a
military junta (see section II of this Comment for a brief discussion of the circumstances surrounding the plaintiffs alleged torture), then the act of torture was not
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mune from suit when charged with committing such an act.
Accordingly, the Republic of Argentina impliedly waived

its rights to sovereign immunity when it was accused of committing an act that was not within its sovereign rights to commit. Any other finding by the Ninth Circuit is akin to sanctioning the behavior, since the state is recognizing a sovereign
right which does not exist under international law.183 Although it cannot be said that by doing so, we are literally excusing the behavior, our action is akin to excusing it. In light
of this finding, the following diatribe by Representative
Bereuter bears reprinting here:
[W]e in the United States are a nation where rule of law and
respect for the individual are recognized as paramount virtues. However, there is no disguising the fact that such is not
the situation in many other nations that do not follow the
U.S. example. With disturbing frequency, certain regimes and
juntas employ terror and torture to maintain control.
Torture is a pervasive, insidious threat to the well-being
of mankind. Those dictators who engage in torture seek to
dehumanize their populations, turning the people into cogs in
a totalitarian regime. Of course, the practice of torture violates the most basic of democratic values. We do not tolerate
the practice of torture in the United States. Nor should we
excuse torture if practiced by others, whether they are
friends or adversaries.18

committed by the sovereign Republic of Argentina and thus the democratic successor to that regime should not be held accountable for its actions. Although it is
beyond the scope of this paper to address all of the moral and political considerations that are inherent in such a discussion, it is noted in United States case
law that "if the party seeking to dislodge the existing government succeeds, and
the independence of the government it has set up is recognized, then the acts of
such a government, from the commencement of its existence, are regarded as those
of an independent nation." Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 253 (1897) (emphasis added). By the time this action was decided by the District Court, a democratic government had already been installed in power, however, that happened
eight years after the coup d'etat. In the meantime, the junta was recognized as
the governing entity, and, thus, all of its actions are regarded by the United
States to be those of a sovereign nation, whether or not they are sovereign acts.
183. See supra notes 63-65 and accompanying discussion regarding the notion
that by granting sovereign immunity, in spite of a jus cogens violation, a nation is
in effect sanctioning that violation.
184. See 135 CONG. REC. H6423-01 (daily ed. Oct. 2, 1989) (statement of Rep.
Breuter). That statement was made as part of a show of support for the Torture
Victim Protection Act, legislation designed to establish an action for recovery for
one who has been the victim of torture, whether a citizen of the United States or
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Although not explicitly stated, the implication of this statement is that if we fail to provide domestic jurisdiction with
respect to instances of torture, then we are on some level condoning the act.
Finally, as a member of the "family of nations," we are
simply not allowed to consent to immunity for a violation ofjus
cogens norms, since violations of such peremptory norms are
not recognized as sovereign acts under international law. Thus,
even if the Ninth Circuit finds that the FSIA's implied waiver
exception was not meant to includ violations of jus cogens
norms, the FSIA must somehow be interpreted to include such
a provision. A basic tenet of statutory construction is that any
act of Congress must never be construed to violate the law of
nations if at all possible. A grant of immunity to the Republic
of Argentina in the Siderman case represents such a violation.
The Ninth Circuit itself has stated: "A state's violation of the
jus cogens norm prohibiting official torture.., would not be
entitled to the immunity afforded by international law." 185 In
light of this acknowledgment, there is no principled basis for
United States courts to consent to a grant of immunity when
requested to adjudicate over such a claim if any other interpretation of the FSIA is possible.'86 Therefore, such an interpretation must be read into the FSIA.
In sum, although Congress did not specifically delineate
violations of jus cogens norms as exceptions to the FSIA, the
FSIA cannot be interpreted to grant immunity in the face of
allegations of such violations. Any other result would be violative of customary international law and thus domestic law,
since the law of nations is the law of the land. 87 While the
Ninth Circuit correctly found that Jos6 Siderman's allegations

an alien. It was introduced as the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1986, but was
not passed until 1992.
185. Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 718 (9th Cir.
1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1812 (1993).
186. For example, the court dismissed the "international agreements" exception,
adopting the narrow interpretation of Amerada Hess. The Ninth Circuit held that
the "Sidermans have failed to identify an international agreement to which the
United States is a party that 'expressly conflict[s] with the immunity provisions of
the FSIA." Id. at 720 (quoting Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping
Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 442 (1989)).
187. See The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) ("International law is
part of our law . .. ").
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of torture against the Republic of Argentina were an obvious
violation ofjus cogens norms, it erroneously granted immunity
to Argentina under the FSIA by incorrectly interpreting international legal doctrine and the extent of the Supreme Court's
holding in Amerada Hess.
VI.

CONCLUSION

In 1946 Justice Robert H. Jackson stated:
By the agreement and this trial we have put International
Law squarely on the side of peace as against aggressive warfare, and on the side of humanity as against persecution. In
the present depressing world outlook it is possible that the
Nuremberg trial may constitute the most important moral
advance to grow out of this war.' 88
A great deal of hope has come from the Nuremberg trials
that now, with the eyes of all nations focused on one another,
we would soon fulfill, as the court in Filartigaphrased it, "that
ageless dream to free all people from brutal violence." 1 89 That
time has not yet come.
On an international level, human rights are still not adequately enforced. This is primarily because there is no supranational body to enforce claims by individuals against their
nations. Indeed, individuals are not even allowed to bring their
claims before the International Court of Justice. 190 They
must depend on their own state to deem their case important
enough to bring it before the International Court of Justice.
It is not as if the entire process that started at Nuremberg
has somehow been stifled or completely failed. Much progress
has been made, as reflected in current international legal principles propounded by conventions, the United Nations, an
overwhelming number of scholars, and persuasive case law.
However, as a noted professor points out, "we are presently in
a temporal gap between the conception of international rules of
domestic jurisdiction and the implementation of those

188. Jackson, supra note 37.
189. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 890 (2d Cir. 1980).
190. The Statute of the International Court of Justice specifies that, "[o]nly
states may be parties in cases before the court." Statute of the International Court
of Justice, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, T.S. No. 993, 3 Bevans 1153, art. 34, §
1.
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rules."1 9 ' The Ninth Circuit's decision in Siderman de Blake
v. Republic of Argentina 92 was a setback for this process. It
shows that in the face of myriad legal principles to the contrary, as well as a defined moral justification, man has chosen
change as his enemy rather than the capricious will of his
fellow man.
For some, this is acceptable, but for Jacobo Timerman,
another Jewish victim of the brutal, anti-Semitic military junta
that overtook Argentina in 1976, this is unfathomable.
Timerman would like to think that after the horrific, genocidal
atrocities committed by the Nazis during World War II, mankind had somehow learned the devastation that his abuses and
excesses could effect, and do anything within his power to curb
that activity. He writes:
How can a nation reproduce in every detail, though employing other forms, in every argument, though employing other
words, the same monstrous crimes explicitly condemned and
clearly expounded so many years before? That is the Argentine mystery: the fact that the world has been unable to
avoid something seemingly destroyed forever in 1945, in the
ashes of Berlin, in the gallows of the Nuremberg Trials, and
in the United Nations Charter. The fact that, in the 1970s, a
'nation of no great importance, undergoing an explosion of
lustful, murderous drives, has found coexistence with the
world at large, without need of ideology and without need of
despair. Merely as a bad hangover of that bygone era, and a
forewarning that these hangovers still prevail and can recur,
time and again, with barely a trace of hope. 93
Scott A. Richman
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Randall, supra note 71, at 840.
965 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1812 (1993).
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